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General overview 
 
This paper is divided into two separate sections. The first part is an abbreviated outline of 
the entire PhD project. The project was accepted and funded by the Flemish Scientific 
Fund (FWO) in 2015 for a period of four years. The second part is an extract of a paper 
describing multiple office-holding in Belgium. The original paper is in Dutch and is 
currently being prepared for journal submission. That way, we provide both a general 
overview of the complete project and show some preliminary research results. 
  
Phd Project 
Introduction 
In this project we aim to study the meaning of the accumulation of political mandates for the 
functioning of local politics in the federal Belgium. Therefore, we scrutinize the evolving 
distribution and impact of this practice through its electoral and functional dimensions.   
In the literature accumulation is alternatively termed as multiple mandate-holding or cumul 
des mandats referring to the French archetypical practice. In this research project it is 
conceived as the simultaneous occupation by one person of an elected mandate at the local 
level (i.e. councillor, alderman or mayor) and a counterpart at the regional or federal level 
(i.e. member of the Flemish Parliament, Walloon Parliament, Brussels Parliament, the 
Chamber and/or the Senate or one of the associated governments). The vertical variant that 
can hence be delineated as dual mandate-holding is at the core of a wider phenomenon of 
legally allowed accumulation in the context of multilevel governance including horizontal 
(at the same level) and/or non-elected (outside the political realm) counterparts (Pilet, 2013).   
Dual mandate-holding is traditionally identified with the political localism characterizing 
the so-called Southern state tradition in which Belgium is often categorized (De Ceuninck 
et al., 2005; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). Therein, local interests and the political 
influence of place-bound governments play an important role in central decision-making. 
Local politicians have direct and frequent access to the centre, where they aim to influence 
the distribution of public provisions (Page & Goldsmith, 1987; Goldsmith & Page, 2010). 
The strength of those municipal councillors is then measured by the extent to which it is 
perceived to generate benefits for its own locality (Page, 1991). In this tradition an ethos of 
communalism and patronage underpins local government (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991). 
Municipalities primarily stand for historically anchored place-bound identities with 
relatively limited functions and discretion. Mediating the interests of their local community 
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vis-à-vis the higher tiers of government then is a prominent assignment of local politicians. 
Individual citizens will turn to these politicians to obtain certain public services and 
provisions. These particularistic motives coexist with more generic considerations striving 
to see the local level represented at the political centre to voice the concerns of the municipal 
sector in supra-local policy. Occupying elected mandates at both levels is thus seen as a 
powerful instrument thereto (Wayenberg et al., 2011).  
Traditionally, linking both layers of government is the most important legitimation of 
vertical cumul (Ackaert, 1994). Nowadays the discourse has shifted to the potential 
disadvantages such as the risk of conflicting interests (implying an objectively unjust 
territorial distribution of supra-local means), the chance of distinct power concentration or 
an excessive time-consumption hindering the appropriate execution of either mandate. 
Observers in France (one of the few countries next to Belgium where vertical accumulation 
is that outspoken) have indeed emphasized the deep entrenchment of localism through dual 
mandate-holding to characterize their whole political system as a ‘république des fiefs’ 
(Mény, 1992). Both the scientific and societal debate predominantly bear on unscientific 
presumptions however. With the exception of fragmented empirical evidence on the extent 
of the phenomenon and some well-informed assessments on its effects, systematic 
comparative evidence on the actual meaning of simultaneously holding political mandates 
at different levels is lacking: ‘… there has been ample conjecture about the causes of this 
practice but little systematic empirical testing of hypotheses. The standard assumption […] 
is that politicians cumulate because it is in their interest to do so; […]. That assumption has 
not been put to empirical examination’ (Blais, 2006: 266).  
Research objectives 
 
This research namely aims to develop a more comprehensive and integrated view on dual 
mandate-holding through two perspectives with the practice both as a dependent as well as 
an independent variable. Each perspective is associated with a main question and consequent 
sub-questions leading to a number of research hypotheses. Our objectives are both cross-
sectional (for a more systematic insight in both perspectives, their mutual interdependency 
and the determination of relevant contingency factors) as well as longitudinal (for the 
evolving character of the distribution and the impact of the phenomenon) with the federal 
Belgium as a reference period. This aim is summarized in table 1 and elaborated upon below.  
Table 1. Summary of research objectives  
Perspective Dual mandate-holding as 
dependent variable 
Dual mandate-holding as 
independent variable 
Main 
question 
How is dual mandate-holding 
distributed in terms of extent and 
reach? 
What is the impact of dual 
mandate-holding in terms of effect 
and underlying causal mechanisms?  
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Sub-
questions  
1. Which variants of dual 
mandate-holding are distributed 
how? 
2. Which factors explain 
variation in (1)?  
3. How have (1) and (2) 
evolved over time? 
1. (How) does dual mandate-
holding have an electoral 
advantage? 
2. (How) does dual mandate-
holding impact upon the time-
allocation as a mandate-holder?  
3. (How) does dual mandate-
holding function as an instrument 
of interest representation for local 
government in general and/or that 
of the dual-mandate holder in 
particular? 
4. How have (1) to (3) evolved 
over time? 
Hypotheses  1. Both the extent and the 
reach of dual mandate-holding 
have increased 
2. The extent of dual mandate-
holding has decreased with a 
more specific reach 
3. Dual mandate-holding is 
significantly higher among 
members of parliament a) of the 
Francophone and/or traditional 
pillar parties, b) from categories 
of the smaller communities, c) 
with more mandate-experience 
and d) a more selective social 
profile  
4. Dual mandate-holding has a 
significant electoral surplus as a) 
(candidate-)members of 
parliament with a local mandate 
will obtain a higher share of 
preference votes in national 
elections, b) parties with a larger 
slate of local mandate-holders on 
their list in a certain constituency 
will obtain a larger electoral 
share, c) (candidate-)councillors 
with a parliamentary mandate will 
obtain a higher share of 
preference votes in local 
elections, d) parties with members 
of parliament on their local 
candidate list will obtain a larger 
electoral share and e) this surplus 
has increased over time 
5. Dual mandate-holding has a 
significant effect on time-
allocation as members of 
parliament with dual mandates a) 
show more supra-local 
absenteeism and less activism; b) 
spend their time more focused on 
local interest mediation and c) 
this effect has increased over time   
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6. Dual mandate-holding 
creates significant opportunities 
for interest mediation as members 
of parliament with dual mandates 
a) will have more effective 
potential to intervene to the 
advantage of their locality, b) but 
will ultimately make the interests 
of their locality subordinate to 
supra-local partisan 
considerations and c) the 
significance of these opportunities 
has decreased over time 
 
The first research perspective focuses on dual mandate-holding as a dependent variable. 
Simultaneously occupying elected mandates at two levels then becomes the explanandum. 
The main question here is: how is the phenomenon distributed in terms of extent and reach? 
Based on the existing literature we can only partially answer these questions. The available 
empirical evidence is namely fragmented due to limitations in focus (either from the central 
perspective or from the local) and/or scope (one or a few electoral years). The most 
developed view (Ackaert, 1994; Fiers, 2001) is that on the national (and later on federal) 
parliament where from 1961 to 1999 the percentage of members with a simultaneous local 
mandate after each renewal of the chambers systematically amounts to around 65% (half of 
these in a local executive mandate). More recent research for specific supra-local elections 
and/or legislative assemblies (including regional parliaments) establishes similar or higher 
percentages (Verleden et al., 2009; Vanlangenakker, Put & Maddens, 2010; Pilet, 2013). 
Taking the two most recent municipal elections as a starting point (Ackaert et al., 2007; 
Rodenbach, Steyvers & Reynaert, 2013) and focusing on the members of the Flemish 
Parliament as well as on their Dutch-speaking counterparts in the federal chambers we can 
find levels of dual mandate-holding of about 80% at the start of the new municipal legislature 
(approximately 45% of which are occupying a local executive mandate). From a comparative 
perspective, Belgium is the country that displays the highest of these percentages after 
France (Kjær, 2006; Verhelst, Reynaert & Steyvers, 2013).  
This research projects aims to supplement and integrate that fragmented empirical evidence 
in federal Belgium. Our reference period envelops regional, federal (1995, 1999, 2003, 2004, 
2009, 2010 and 2014) and local (2000, 2006 and 2012) elections. It starts from two rival 
hypotheses referring to the sub-questions 2 and 3 mentioned. The first hypothesizes that both 
the extent and the reach of dual mandate-holding have increased throughout the reference 
period (H1). The most important explanation for that lays in the institutional transformation 
towards a federal and layered system in which the possible avenues for political careers have 
diversified and the number of available supra-local mandates have increased accordingly 
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(Pilet & Fiers, 2013). The second alternatively hypothesizes that the extent of dual mandate-
holding has decreased in conjunction with a more specific reach of the phenomenon (H2). 
This is informed by a number of mutually reinforcing evolutions. For one thing, since the 
reform of 2003 the scale of electoral constituencies has been enlarged (from districts to 
provinces, implying a de-localization) giving national party headquarters more grip on the 
selection of (at least the eligible) candidates and diminishing the potentially determining 
effect of local notoriety. However, geographical spreading remains an element of ticket 
balancing and recruiting the associated local executive mandate-holders electorally 
beneficial (Maddens & Put, 2010). Therefore, we expect a less extensive type of dual 
mandate-holding to emerge that is more specifically anchored in the local executive. For 
another, the federalization process has led to the regions increasingly becoming the 
constitutive and policy-related frame of reference for local government. This leads us to 
expect that dual mandate-holding will concentrate more on the regional level (De Ceuninck 
et al., 2005). From recently available literature we can also infer a number of hypotheses 
(H3a-d) referring to the sub-questions 2 and 3 testing their generalizability in space and/or 
over time.  
In the second research perspective attention shifts to dual mandate-holding as an independent 
variable. Simultaneously occupying elected mandates at two levels then becomes the 
explanans. The main question here is: what is the impact of the phenomenon in terms of 
effect and underlying causal mechanisms? It can be divided into the following sub-questions: 
1) (how) does dual mandate-holding have an electoral advantage; 2) (how) does dual 
mandate-holding impact upon the time-allocation as a mandate-holder 3) (how) does dual 
mandate-holding function as an instrument of interest representation for local government 
in general and/or that of the dual-mandate holder in particular; and 4) how have (1) to (3) 
evolved over time? Based on the existing literature we can only partially answer these 
questions as well. Here in particular, well-informed assessments often outweigh empirical 
evidence. The literature often assumes that combining mandates is electorally beneficiary. 
Dual mandate-holding pays off both collectively (for the candidate list as a whole) as well 
as individually (for the candidate who simultaneously holds mandates). Occupying a place-
bound mandate provides local roots and apparent visibility in a constituency. These are 
important in the selection process for (eligible) electoral positions where parties tend to pitch 
their (executive) local mandate-holders in the supra-local electoral strive (Ackaert, 1994; Put 
& Maddens, 2013). For politicians the practice functions as a kind of baobab-strategy: it 
subtracts almost all political resources from the environment allowing little competition 
(François, 2006).  
This leads to a number of hypotheses based on the allegedly significant electoral surplus of  
dual mandate-holding. (Candidate-)members of parliament with a local mandate will obtain 
a higher share of preference votes in national elections than their counterparts who do not 
hold dual mandates (H4a). And parties with a larger slate of local mandate-holders on their 
list in a certain constituency will obtain a larger electoral share than their counterparts in 
other constituencies (H4b). In reverse, it is hypothesized that (candidate-)councillors with a 
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parliamentary mandate will obtain a higher share of preference votes in local elections than 
their counterparts who do not occupy dual mandates (H4c). And parties with members of 
parliament on their local candidate list will obtain a larger electoral share than chapters in 
other municipalities where this is lacking (H4d). Finally (with regard to sub-question 4), we 
hypothesize that the impact of dual mandate-holding as an electoral strategy has increased 
over time (H4e) due to the growing importance of preferential voting as a result of the 
personalization of politics in general and the diminished effect of the transfer of list votes in 
particular (Karvonen, 2010; André, Wauters & Pilet, 2012).  
In addition and with regard to sub-question 2 it is often assumed that dual mandate-holding 
has a significant effect on the time-allocation of mandate-holders (Pilet, 2013; François & 
Weil, 2014). On the one hand, this effect is apparent in scope of time. Those who occupy a 
dual mandate cannot reasonably spend an equal amount of time to each of those without this 
having an effect on (one of) both. The local mandate (as the prime power base) may then 
well prevail. We hypothesize that members of parliament who simultaneously hold a local 
mandate show more supra-local absenteeism and a ditto lower degree of activism (H5a). At 
the same time, they spend their parliamentary time more focused with a view to local interest 
mediation (H5b). Members of parliament who accumulate with a local mandate then make 
more use of questions and/or interpellations to bring attention to local problems with a supra-
local dimension (Vaesen, 2006). Finally (with regard to sub-question 4), we hypothesize that 
the effect of dual mandate-holding on time-allocation has increased (H5c) due to the 
dynamics of both local as well as national political professionalization (Cotta & Best, 2007;  
Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012).  
Finally, the literature makes of number of assumptions on sub-question 3. The starting point 
here is that dual mandate-holding creates specific and significant opportunities for influence 
deemed to benefit local interests in central decision-making. Its impact might in reality be 
twofold however and create rival tendencies. On the one hand, they may render dual 
mandate-holders more effective potential to intervene to the advantage of their own locality 
(H6a). On the other hand they may also enhance dependency on the centre: supra-local (re-
)election as a necessary condition for the (continued) effect of dual-mandate holding may 
then lead to conforming to national party discipline. Dual mandate-holders will therefore 
ultimately make the interests of local government subordinate to supra-local partisan 
considerations (H6b). The literature suggests that this type of impact would be significantly 
larger in the French-speaking part of the country (H6c) and with regard to central investment 
decisions (as opposed to intergovernmental routine programs; H6d). This stems from the 
diminishing of political localism in Flanders where a more neutral management style and 
contractual planning relations between localities and the centre have emerged (De Rynck & 
Wayenberg, 2010). A more pluralist governmental context affects the shifting 
intergovernmental relations. Horizontal coalitions with non-state actors have become almost 
equally important as vertical access to the centre for local policy-making (Pinson, 2010). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the impact of dual mandate-holding as an instrument of local 
interest representation has decreased over time (H6e).        
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Methodology 
 
For a more comprehensive and integrated view on the distribution and the impact of dual 
mandate-holding this research adopts a mixed methods design with four phases (Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). It concerns the sequential variant that primarily applies 
statistical analysis for the measurement of phenomena and the determination of probabilities. 
The results of that analysis are the basis for a complementary selection of cases in which so-
called model-fitting exemplars can be used to unravel underlying causal mechanisms (i.e. 
process verification). Deviant counterparts can then add variables to established theories 
through process induction (Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006; Creswell & Plano, 2011). The 
starting point of this design throughout its different phases is a quantitative analysis of cross-
sectional secondary data supplemented with primary, qualitative and/or longitudinal ones.  
With regard to the first perspective (dual mandate-holding as a dependent variable) we aim 
to develop a quantitative database for the period of reference of our study allowing 
multivariate regression and the analysis of time series. A pooled analysis is intended 
(maximizing the number of cases over time and space). With regard to the second 
perspective (dual-mandate holding as an independent variable) primary data collection or 
qualitative supplements will predominate. Here the comparison over time will be made 
through a closed universe (relevant cases at relevant moments, i.e. cohorts of dual mandate-
holders at the beginning (1995), in the middle (2003/4) and at the end (2014) of our reference 
period). Regression analysis is supplemented by comparative case study.  
In a first phase we intend to refine these perspectives and explore our hypotheses with 
secondary analysis of quantitative data on dual mandate-holding. For the first perspective 
(H1-3) we start from the fragmented empirical evidence on dual mandate-holding gathered 
in the context of the parliamentary elections referred to in the research objective and data 
collected by the Centre for Local Politics after the municipal elections of 2006 and 2012. 
The latter data are limited to the Flemish Parliament and the Dutch-speaking group in its 
federal counterparts. For the second perspective and with regard to the first sub-question we 
can draw on a number of CLP-datasets on municipal elections since 1976 including data on 
electoral shares and preference votes for our period of reference (H4c-e). The second and 
the third sub-question (H5-6 a-c) can be explored by using the Belgian data of the 
comparative projects Political Leaders in European Cities  (mayors; first wave in 2004; 
second wave planned in 2015) and Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance 
(aldermen and councillors; 2008). The CLP was the Belgian partner in these projects 
(including approximately 15 countries). Each dataset encloses a variable probing into dual 
mandate-holding and allows to make linkages with the time-allocation and 
intergovernmental relations that are central in these sub-questions.  
The hypotheses that have thus been refined can be further tested in a second phase. To that 
end primary data are necessary reflecting the nature of those collected earlier given the 
longitudinal purpose of part of this research. For the first perspective (H1-3) this implies a 
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completion for the local elections at the beginning of our reference period, the more recent 
parliamentary elections and/or the Francophone part of the country. With the exception of 
the most recent ones that are available through the parliamentary websites, these data will 
be obtained by archival research in the biographical collections of the various regional or 
federal parliamentary information, documentation and archive centres. For the second 
perspective and with regard to the first sub-question (H4a-b and e) we will comprise a dataset 
for the parliamentary elections in our reference period based on datasets made available 
online by the regional and federal government (i.e. www.vlaanderenkiest.be or 
www.verkiezingen.fgov.be). These include data both on the level of candidate lists as well as 
on individual candidates. For the second (H5) and third (H6a-c) sub-question and based on 
the websites of the various assemblies we can obtain insight into and compare the 
parliamentary activities (from legislative initiatives over plenary or committee interventions 
to questions and additional oversight and control actions) of (dual) mandate-holders. This 
can be analysed by applying the nominal method Vaesen (2006) has developed for the 
Brussels Parliament (in which the local character of parliamentary activities is deduced by 
screening for key-words in topics or subject-fields).  
On this quantitative basis a comparative case study will be established in the third phase of 
the research. These cases will be selected as to on the one hand fit with the findings of the 
previous phases whereby we will focus on the causal mechanism of dual mandate-holding 
(i.e. the ‘how’-questions in the second perspective or process verification). On the other hand 
we will scrutinize deviant cases that will determine additional contingency factors through 
process induction affecting the impact of dual mandate-holding. This phase emphasizes 
verification. In selecting specific cases we will take the different types of (e.g. executive 
versus non-executive local mandates) and contexts for (regional versus federal mandates) 
dual mandate-holders into consideration. This phase must also allow to probe into the less 
visible and informal aspects of interest mediation through dual mandate-holding. Here, we 
will use comparative qualitative methods (Landman, 2008) including in-depth interviews 
with and observation of the selected dual mandate-holders supplemented with other relevant 
actors (such as colleagues mandate-holders or parliamentary group leaders).  
Preliminary results 
In this section, we will show some preliminary results based on the first perspective of this 
research proposal. We will skip the literature review, that has been partly covered in the 
introduction and research objectives, and only focus on the results and discussion due to 
place restrictions. In the first part of the PhD multiple office-holding is the dependent 
variable and we study the extent and reach of the phenomenon from a longitudinal and 
cross-sectional perspective. We will discuss hypotheses 1, 2 , 3a & 3b below but neglect 
H3c & 3b, as they are covered in a second paper where we try to explain dual mandate-
holding based on multinomial regression model (sub question 2), which is being prepared 
at the moment.  
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Our data consists of all members of Belgian parliaments and governments during our 
reference period 1995 – 2014, that is the federal chamber and senate, the Flemish 
parliament, the Walloon parliament and the Brussels parliament. There was insufficient 
and unreliable data about the 25 members of the German-speaking community parliament, 
that has consequently been disregarded in following analyses. While we possess data of 
2512 representatives and ministers, we must bear in mind that these are in fact only 1417 
unique individuals. Also note that a snapshot was taken of every parliament after the 
installation of government, so that elected representatives that took a ministerial office are 
already replaced in parliament. Individual substitutions during the legislature are not 
brought into account.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage of multiple office-holders in five Belgian parliaments and governments 
(1995 - 2014). 
 
Figure 1 shows three important findings: the increasing level of cumul, the stability of the 
federal-local combination and the drops in 1999 and 2010. All of them will be discussed in 
order. First of all, these results demonstrates that extent of dual mandate-holding has 
increased throughout the reference period. There is a gradual and positive evolution in the 
amount of cumulards. In 1995 about 68.7% of all politicians had a second local position, 
whereas in 2014 after the last elections more than 80% had one. During the entire period, 
the total level of cumul amounts to 70.5%. A striking example, there is almost no 
difference between members of parliament and members of government. In the case of the 
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latter, two thirds also had a municipal office. Although, we must stress that at that moment 
a special mechanism comes into effect. This indicates that the combination of multilevel 
governance and the Belgian federalization process provides politicians with more avenues 
for supra-local careers. The possibilities of this evolution are being fully grasped by 
politicians, so it seems.    
 
Due to that same federalization process, regions became the reference point for local 
governments, as more and more competences have been transferred to the three regions.  
However, the federal-local combination is still the most popular form of cumul. Multiple 
office-holders do not migrate to the regional level and based on these results, there is no 
indication that they will concentrate on the regional level in the future.  
The exponential drops in 1999 and 2010 are caused by electoral swings, and more 
specifically by victories of new political parties. In 1999 the green and the right wing 
extremist party both made significant progress in federal and regional elections. Although 
they were successful on the (sub)national level, their local embeddedness was almost none 
existent. Therefore, the absolute majority of the new representatives had no local mandate, 
resulting in a decline of the total level of multiple office-holders. A similar effect occurs in 
2010, when the restructured Flemish nationalist party wins the federal elections with more 
than 30% of the votes.  
Figure 2. Percentage of municipal representatives per language group (1995 - 2014). 
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The second hypothesis assumed that the reach of double mandates would become more 
specific, oriented towards a local executive function. Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
frequency of a certain local mandate is dependent on the language group, but nevertheless is 
quite stable. For example, we see that most members of parliament are simultaneously 
municipal councillor in both language groups. Although francophone representatives opt 
more often for an executive position, compared to their Flemish colleagues, we cannot speak 
of a sharp increase. The electoral reforms of 2003 did seem to have an effect, albeit small. 
In Flanders, the expansion of electoral constituencies resulted in a growing number of 
ordinary councillor. Contrary to our assumptions, they are responsible for the intensification 
of multiple office-holding. In southern Belgium the amount of mayors has increased after 
2003, while the number of aldermen has decreased. This could suggest that political parties 
in Wallonia expect the most electoral potential of a mayoral position. Yet, the effect is 
temporary as the amount of both executive functions seems to stabilize afterwards. To 
conclude, we did not found a general trend towards a more specific form of cumul, anchored 
in the local executive. If there was any impact of electoral reforms, it can only be discerned 
in Wallonia.  
Figure 3. Percentage of multiple office-holder in each party, per language group (1995 -
2014). 
 
H3a suggested that the amount of multiple office-holders would be higher in francophone 
and traditional parties. Previous figures already gave an impression of the distribution of 
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dual mandate-holders among language groups based on region. Although, caution is 
required. For example,  figure 1 show federal representatives of the chamber and senate, but 
they are both populated by dutch and francophone politicians. Figure 3, on the other hand, 
brings a clear image of the evolution between the language groups and political parties. First, 
multiple office-holding is somewhat less frequent in Flanders, confirming hypothesis 3a. 
However, the trend is definitely increasing in both regions. In addition, the Flemish 
interparty variation is large and very volatile. We believe both are caused by electoral swings 
and the introduction of new parties. There seems to be an inverse relation between electoral 
success and the number of cumulards. When parties are victorious, new members get into 
parliament that often do not have a local function. When the results are disappointing, mostly 
experienced and incumbent cumulards get re-elected. Similarly, new parties seize their first 
win on the national or regional level and acquire parliamentary seats. In subsequent 
elections, they duplicate their success at the local level, allowing them to introduce more 
municipal councillors in the next national electoral strive. This explains the increasing trend 
of multiple office-holding in new parties. All Walloon parties have more dual mandate-
holders compared to the average Flemish party, although the difference is small and 
decreased throughout time. Écolo, the green party in Wallonia, is the only exception.  
Second, a first glance at figure 3 reveals that traditional pillar parties (Christian democrats, 
liberals and socialists) have more cumulards in their respective fractions compared to new 
parties. But when we take into account that new parties need time to translate national 
success into local success, and then back into national success, the differences are not that 
large. The Flemish extreme right party, green party and nationalist party all seem to copy the 
strategy of the traditional parties and try to include as many municipal representatives in 
their candidate lists. In general the degree of cumulards becomes more and more similar 
through time, although some discrepancies continue to exist. In Flanders, the three pillar 
parties still are on top of the cumul-list in 2014. In Wallonia, the picture could not have been 
more clear. The green party is nowhere near the level of multiple office-holders of the 
traditional ones. In short, even when accounting for nuances, new parties have less dual 
mandate-
holders.   
Table 1. 
Percentage of 
local 
representatives per municipal category (1995 – 2014). 
 
 
 
 Rural 
commune 
Urbanized 
commune 
Urbanized 
centre 
Regional  
city 
Total number MP’s 603 694 626 808 
Percentage cumulards 66% 75% 72% 65% 
- Mayor 20% 32% 22% 5% 
- Alderman 15% 15% 17% 12% 
- Councillor 31% 28% 22% 48% 
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Lastly, we found an inverse U relation between the degree of cumul and the municipal degree 
of urbanization. The later has been divided into four categories based on an extensive socio-
economical typology of Belgian communes (Belfius, 2007), ranging from the smallest rural 
communes with few inhabitants and limited economical potential to regional cities that have 
plenty of both. The data in table 1 shows that members of parliament originating from rural 
communes or regional cities are less inclined to combine two mandates. MP’s elected in 
urbanized communes or centres are far more likely to have a local function. Even more, the 
difference is most outspoken among mayors. Only 5% of city representatives are mayor, 
whereas 32% of representatives from smaller urbanized communes are mayor. The number 
of aldermen is almost equally distributed, but municipal councillors are more frequent 
among city and rural MP’s to cover for their lack of executive cumulards. It is possible that 
executive functions in larger communes have a significantly higher workload, and therefore 
withhold them to combine several mandates. However, we want to stress that there are only 
31 regional cities in the sample, which could overstate our results. The reduced level of 
cumul within small, rural communes is completely unexpected. 
Conclusion 
The results indicate that multiple office-holding is extremely widespread in Belgium. In 
addition, the phenomenon is still on the rise since regional parliaments were directly elected 
in 1995. After the last elections, four out of five Belgian representatives had a second local 
mandate. The type of local mandate, however, differs slightly among language groups. In 
the southern region, francophone representatives opt more frequently for an executive 
municipal function, primarily the one of mayor. In Flanders, municipal legislative 
councillors are clearly more popular. There is however no evolution towards an executive 
interpretation of the double mandate. The regional discrepancy is similar when considering 
political parties, where the francophone ones consistently have more cumulards. Also, 
traditional parties have more local councillors in their fractions, but new parties try to copy 
their strategies quickly. After their first national electoral success, they systematically 
include more municipal representatives in their parliamentary fractions. The only exception 
is the green francophone party (Écolo), where only half of the MP’s accumulates. Lastly, the 
smallest and the largest communes have the least number of cumulards. Particularly mayors 
of regional cities are rarely found in parliament.  
Bibliography 
 
Ackaert, J. (1994). De nationalisatie van de gemeentepolitiek. Een onderzoek naar de 
verwevenheid tussen nationale politiek en gemeentepolitiek op het niveau van de 
politieke mandatarissen. In Gemeentekrediet (Ed.), De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen en 
hun impact op de Belgische politiek (pp. 587-606). Brussel: Gemeentekrediet. 
14 
 
Ackaert, J., De Ceuninck, K., Reynaert, H., Steyvers, K. & Valcke, T. (2007). Doen 
wijzigende instituties ertoe? De invloed van het gemeente(kies)decreet op de 
gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2006. Res Publica, 49(1), 15-33. 
André, A., Wauters, B. & Pilet, J.-B. (2012). It's not only about lists: explaining preference 
voting in Belgium. Journal of Elections, Parties and Public Opinion, 22(3), 293-313. 
Blais, A. (2006). The Causes and Consequences of the Cumul des Mandats. French Politics, 
4(3), 266-268. 
Cotta, M. & Best, H. (Eds.) (2007). Democratic representation in Europe: diversity, change 
and convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Creswell, J. & Plano, L. (2011). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. Sage: 
London. 
De Ceuninck, K., Devos, C., Reynaert, H., Staelraeve, S., Steyvers, K., Valcke, T. & Verlet, 
D. (2005). Centraal-lokale relaties in Vlaanderen: verdeel of heers? Res Publica, 47(1), 
19-35. 
De Rynck, F. & Wayenberg, E. (2010). Belgium. In M. Goldsmith & E. Page (Eds.), 
Changing Government Relations in Europe. From Localism to Intergovernmentalism (pp. 
14-29). London: Routledge. 
Fiers, S. (2001). Carrièrepatronen van Belgische parlementsleden in een multi-level 
omgeving (1979-1999). Res Publica, 43(1), 171-192. 
François, A. (2006). Testing the ‘Baobab Tree’ Hypothesis: The Cumul des Mandats as a 
Way of Obtaining More Political Resources and Limiting Electoral Competition. French 
Politics, 4(3), 269-291. 
François, A. & Magni-Berton, R. (2014). The effects of the 2001 French law on multi-
holding of electoral mandates. French Politics, 12(1), 69-76. 
François, A. & Weill, L. (2014). Le cumul de mandats locaux affecte-t-il l’activité des 
députés français? Revue Economique, 65(6), 881-906.  
Goldsmith, M. & Page, E. (2010). Conclusion. In M. Goldsmith & E. Page (Eds.), Changing 
Government Relations in Europe. From Localism to Intergovernmentalism (pp. 247-260). 
London: Routledge. 
Hesse, J. & Sharpe, L. (1991). Local Government in International Perspective: Some 
Comparative Observations. In J. Hesse (Ed.), Local Government and Urban Affairs in 
International Perspective. Analyses of Twenty Western Industrialized Countries (pp. 605-
608). Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Ivankova, N., Creswell, J. & Stick, S. (2006). Using Mixed-Methods Sequential Explanatory 
Design: From Theory to Practice. Field Methods, 18(1), 3-20. 
Johnson, R., Onwuegbuzie, A. & Turner, L. (2007). Towards a Definition of Mixed Methods 
Research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2), 112-133. 
Karvonen, L. (2010). The Personalization of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary 
Democracies. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Kjaer, U. (2006). The Mayor’s Political Career. In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt & A. Magnier (Eds.), 
The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy 
(pp. 75-98). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
15 
 
Landman, T. (2008). Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. London: Routlegde.  
Mény, Y. (1992). La République des fiefs. Pouvoirs, 60(60), 17-24. 
Olislagers, E. (2013). Calculation or donation? Choosing partners in local coalition 
formation in the Flemish region of Belgium. Ghent: Department of Political Science (Doc. 
Dissertation).  
Page, E. & Goldsmith, M. (1987). Centre and Locality: Functions, Access and Discretion. 
In E. Page & M. Goldsmith (Eds.), Central and Local Government Relations. A 
Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States (pp. 3-11). London: Sage.  
Page, E. (1991). Localism and Centralism in Europe. The Political and Legal Bases of Local 
Self-Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peters, G. (2013). Strategies for comparative research in political science: theory and 
methods. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Pilet, J.-B. (2013). Le cumul des mandats dans un système politique multi-niveaux: le cas 
de la Belgique. In A. François & J. Navarro (Eds.), Le cumul des mandats en France: 
causes et conséquences (pp.81-97). Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles.   
Pilet, J., Fiers, S. (2013). Vers la constitution d'élites politiques séparées? Carrières des 
parlementaires et représentation territoriale dans la Belgique fédérale. In R. Dandoy, G. 
Matagne & C. Van Wynsberghe (Eds.), Le fédéralisme belge : enjeux institutionnels, 
acteurs socio-politiques et opinions publiques (pp. 111-138), Louvain-La-Neuve: 
Academia-L'Harmattan. 
Pinson, G. (2010). France. In M. Goldsmith & E. Page (Eds.), Changing Government 
Relations in Europe. From Localism to Intergovernmentalism (pp. 68-87). London: 
Routledge. 
Put, G.-J. & Maddens, B. (2013). The Selection of Candidates for Eligible Positions on PR 
Lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999–2010. Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, 23(1), 49-65.  
Rodenbach, J., Steyvers, K. & Reynaert, H. (2013). Tussen dorpsstraat en wetstraat? 
Burgemeesters als stemmenkampioenen en cumulards. In H. Reynaert & K. Steyvers 
(Eds.), De kracht van verankering? De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 14 oktober 2012 
(pp. 141-162). Brugge: Vanden Broele. 
Steyvers, K. & Verhelst, T. (2012). Between Layman and professional? Political recruitment 
and career development of local councilors in comparative perspective. Lex Localis, 
10(1), 85-101.  
Vaesen, J. (2006). Voor gemeente en lokaal belang? De verwevenheid van het lokale en 
regionale niveau in Brussel via de cumulatie van mandaten (1989-2004). Res Publica, 
48(1), 40-65. 
Vanlangenakker, I., Put, G. & Maddens, B. (2010). Het profiel van de gekozenen bij de 
federale verkiezingen van 13 juni 2010. Leuven: KUL. 
Verhelst, T., Reynaert, H. & Steyvers, K. (2013). Political Recruitment and Career 
Development of Local Councillors in Europe. In B. Egner, D. Sweeting & P.-J. Klok 
(Eds.), Local Councillors in Europe (pp. 27-51). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
16 
 
Verleden, F., Put, G., Maddens, B., Vanlangenakker, I. & Weekers, K. (2009). Het profiel 
van de gekozenen in het Vlaams Parlement na de verkiezingen van 7 juni 2009. Leuven: 
KUL. 
Wayenberg, E., De Rynck, F., Steyvers, K. & Pilet, J.-B. (2011). Belgium: a Tale of Regional 
Divergence? In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks & A. Lidström (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Local and Regional Democracy in Europe (pp. 71-95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
  
